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ABSTRACT
JELLE KOEDAM: Who’s at the Helm?
The Effect of Party Organization on Party Position Change
(Under the direction of Gary Marks.)
Parties continuously change their position in a competitive environment. Their motivations
to do so, however, are highly contested. A recent study has suggested that the internal
balance of power between party leaders and activists might be the driving force behind
whether a party responds to shifts in the mean voter position or the mean party voter po-
sition, respectively. Extending a pooled time-series analysis of 55 parties in 10 European
democracies between 1977 and 2003, this paper seeks to test these findings by accounting
for several additional party characteristics and environmental incentives. The results show
that while the original explanation holds up in some circumstances, some qualifications are
in order.
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Introduction
Why do parties change position? Ever since the seminal work by Downs (1957) on
the median voter theorem, political scientists have been trying to understand and map how
political parties locate themselves in a competitive political landscape, and what factors lead
them to alter their position. It goes without saying that in the past few decades the literature
on party competition has made major leaps forward, developing sophisticated models that
take into account office and policy-seeking behavior of parties, the multi-dimensionality
of party systems, and the salience of political issues, to name but a few examples (Adams,
Merrill & Grofman 2005, Belanger & Meguid 2008, Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002, Kriesi
et al. 2006, Meguid 2005).
Recently, however, scholars have started to connect the party competition literature to
a relatively unexplored field of party politics (for classic exceptions, see Duverger 1954,
Michels 1962 [1911], Panebianco 1988), namely to how the internal workings of parties
affect their strategic behavior. By opening up what to most existing work is a black box,
studies have been able to show that intra-party characteristics do matter for inter-party com-
petition. Schumacher, de Vries & Vis (2013), for instance, show that parties dominated by
the party leadership are generally more responsive to (changes in) the position of the mean
voter, whereas activist-dominated parties are more inclined to reflect the mean party voter
position.
While this is certainly a valuable and novel contribution to an already extensive litera-
ture, some qualifications to the authors’ theoretical argument can be brought to the fore that
call for empirical testing. Three conditions, in particular, ought to be accounted for. First, an
often used qualification in the party competition literature that might be worthwhile explor-
ing here is that between so-called mainstream and niche parties (Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow
et al. 2011, Meguid 2005). While mainstream parties generally represent a large set of is-
sues (and people), niche parties are taken to be more extreme and compete above all on
“second dimension” political issues, such as immigration and the environment. Does the
importance of the internal power concentration still hold up when accounting for this?
Second, one might argue that a party’s position on the dimension of political contes-
tation can greatly affect, or limit, its positional flexibility. Independent from party orga-
nizational characteristics, parties operating on the fringes of the political spectrum might
approach party competition in a completely different way than more centrist parties. Are
more extremist parties still responsive to the median voter or do they only care about the
preferences of their own supporters?1
Finally, the level of fragmentation of a party system has been found to influence the
relationship between party behavior and organization (Lehrer 2012). Specifically, as the
political arena becomes more crowded, this puts constraints on the parties’ room to maneu-
ver, and should logically lead them to be less responsive to voter shifts. Furthermore, the
differences between party leaders and activists cannot be too large, or activists will have an
incentive to exit the party and join any of the multitude of alternatives.
Using the original dataset by Schumacher, de Vries & Vis (2013), I will account for
these qualitative and contextual factors and test whether their original findings withstand
further scrutiny. As such, my analysis will focus on 55 parties in 10 established European
democracies in the period 1977-2003. This paper has important implications both for our
collective understanding of party competition in established democracies, as well as for
our normative view of mass-elite linkages and the responsiveness of democratically elected
political actors.
1While sometimes defined as simply non-centrist, niche parties are classified in a more sophisticated manner
here. For a full conceptualization of this party type, see Section 2.3.1.
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Why Do Parties Change Position?
The study of party competition has a rich and impressive tradition in the field of compar-
ative politics. After introducing some of the pivotal spatial theories of party behavior, this
section moves on to connect this literature to the relatively recent attention for the internal
workings of political parties and its importance for party competition. Finally, hypotheses
are presented that will guide the empirical section of this paper.
Spatial theories of party competition
The study of party competition has traditionally been dominated by spatial theories.
These models, in line with the work by Downs (1957), view party competition as a strug-
gle over positional issues. Parties - and voters - disagree on the best response to certain
problems that society faces, thus offering alternative policy proposals to the electorate.
While ideological proximity is generally assumed to be the crucial determinant of vote
choice, competing theories have been developed, with discounting and directional voting
being the most prominent alternatives (Adams, Merrill & Grofman 2005, Bawn & Somer-
Topcu 2012, Grofman 1985, Rabinowitz & Macdonald 1989).
Party competition is no static endeavor, however. Both the positions of parties and
voters are continuously in flux, resulting in a dynamic interaction between political supply
and demand. As the responsiveness of political parties is of paramount importance to the
mass-elite linkages so central to democratic representation, it comes as no surprise that a
lot of research has been done on this question of how parties change position and, arguably
even more important, why? Several answers have been presented over the years, each worth
discussing here.
First and foremost, and in line with our normative understanding of democratic repre-
sentation, parties have been found to respond to changes in the position of the median voter
(Adams, Merrill & Grofman 2005).2 As the electorate, as a whole, becomes more leftist
2The mean and median voter position are used interchangeably here. For their measurement, see “Section 3:
Data & Method”.
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(or rightist), parties appropriately respond to this positional change by moving in the same
direction. In subsequent studies, however, this finding has been found not to apply to a cer-
tain group of parties, namely niche parties (Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow et al. 2011). Instead,
this subset of parties (more on their characteristics below) responds to position changes
of different sub-constituencies, in particular their own supporters. Given their specialized
policy agenda, general public opinion is less of a concern to them.
In addition, parties’ policy positions have also been found to be affected by a range
of environmental conditions, including electoral defeat (Baekgaard & Jensen 2012, Budge
1994, Budge, Ezrow & McDonald 2010, Somer-Topcu 2009), governing status (Bawn &
Somer-Topcu 2012), and changing economic conditions (Adams, Haupt & Stoll 2008,
Haupt 2010). Finally, it goes without saying that political parties are also responsive to
each other’s policy moves (Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009, Laver 2005, Williams & Whitten
2015).
The intra-party balance of power
In an attempt to contribute to an already immense literature, Schumacher, de Vries &
Vis (2013) show how party organization can explain variation in the way parties respond to
such environmental incentives. Specifically, the degree to which parties are dominated by
either leaders or activists determines to a great extent what type of voter a party is responsive
to. According to the authors, parties that are dominated by party leaders show fewer ways
in which the rank-and-file can influence the internal decision-making process, leaving the
few actors at the top of the organization in charge of party policy (Schumacher, de Vries
& Vis 2013, 465). In activist-dominated parties, by contrast, many actors are involved in
setting the party’s goals and agenda, such as local and regional branches or other types of
delegates, thus constraining the leadership and their preferred course of action.
This internal balance of power between party leaders and activists is important, the au-
thors argue, because it greatly affects the behavior of the party as a whole. Party leaders
are assumed to be vote and office-seeking, as they are primarily interested in the spoils
that come with being in office. In true Downsian tradition, it follows that leader-dominated
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parties are responsive to (changes in) the mean voter position. Positioning one’s self in the
center and responding to the median voter is the ultimate vote-maximizing strategy and,
consequently, produces the highest chance of getting into office. Party activists, on the
other hand, are more than anything else policy-seeking, “as they commit their time, money,
and effort with the aim of voicing a specific ideological view” (Schumacher, de Vries &
Vis 2013, 465). For them, holding office is only a secondary concern. Viewing the party
as a vehicle to express the opinions of like-minded activists, such parties will first and fore-
most be responsive to changes in the preferences of their supporters, i.e. the mean party
voter position, with party leaders lacking any degree of independence. Thus, different en-
vironmental incentives are important for leader-dominated and activist-dominated parties.
On a final note, it is important to distinguish between this conceptualization of faction-
alism, understood here as a distinction between more office-motivated party leaders and
the ideologues that are party activists, and the way in which it has been defined by Budge,
Ezrow & McDonald (2010), among others. While both accounts depart from the common
assumption that parties are unitary actors rid of internal division, the latter views parties as
a collection of ideological factions competing for dominance. Using this assumptions, they
explain why, after a party suffers from electoral defeat, it might lead to a policy shift in an
opposite direction: An opposing faction might take over the party and implement a strategy
in line with its own, alternative perspective. While equally interesting, the focus here will
be on the alleged divide between party leaders and activists, not the internal competition
between different ideological camps.
Alternative explanations
There are, however, several explanations that the authors do not account for in their
analysis, which might be the driving force behind at least part of the observed variation in
party behavior. Before turning to these approaches, it is important to list the underlying as-
sumptions on which their theoretical framework rests, as these can be indirectly challenged
via the proposed alternative approaches.
First, building on existing studies of party competition, Schumacher, de Vries & Vis
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(2013) argue that the primary and most effective vote-maximizing strategy is to be respon-
sive to the median voter - be it either by converging on its ideological position or by moving
in the same direction from one election to the next (or both). Yet, one might question to
what extent a move to (or ‘with’) the ideological center is electorally advantageous. For in-
stance, voters might discount policy promises made in election campaigns, simply because
they are aware that politicians are unable to fully alter the status quo as they desire, leading
them to vote for the more extreme candidate or party. This ensures that, even when watered
down, a sufficiently outspoken ideological program remains in the end. Similarly, Duch,
May & Armstrong (2010) find that voters also take the bargaining process into account that
comes with coalition formation after the election, thus providing an incentive to vote for
a party that is not situated in the very center of the political spectrum. Both explanations
also justify controlling for the type of party system in place in a country (see Lehrer 2012).
In either case, it is perhaps not as straightforward as often assumed that the median voter
strategy is the way to go to maximize one’s votes and secure office.
Second, some scholars have argued that party organizations have changed altogether,
undermining the role of activists in particular. Presenting their well-known cartelization
thesis, Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) state that in virtually all established democracies, parties
have moved away from their supporters and are now cooperating to prevent the entrance
of new parties. With party membership being on an all time low (Mair & van Biezen
2001), party leaders are increasingly shielded from activist influences in their office-seeking
behavior.
Finally, the very assumption that leadership-dominated parties and activist-dominated
parties are office-seeking and policy-seeking, respectively, can be challenged. Thinking of
the populist radical right, for instance, these are often very hierarchical organizations, led
by a strong, charismatic leader. Yet, far from being concerned with actually making it into
government (if at all allowed by other parties), these parties are generally highly ideological
and seek to influence policy through parliamentary channels instead - although government
participation is possible, of course. Similarly, activists might very well be interested in
getting into office, as they realize holding executive power is the best way to achieve their
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goals. Thus, the intra-party balance of power between leaders and activists might not be the
defining feature when trying to explain a party’s strategic behavior.
Taken together, several concerns can be raised about the determining influence of party
leaders and activist on a party’s strategic behavior. The alternative approaches that follow
from these concerns can be categorized into three groups, some relating more to environ-
mental incentives other than those controlled for in the original analysis, while still others
address the characteristics of the party itself. The three categories concern (1) the type of
party, (2) its ideological position, and (3) the nature of party competition. All three are
worthwhile discussing in more detail below.
Types of political parties
One of the most commonly used typologies of political parties in the party compe-
tition literature is that between mainstream and niche parties (Abou-Chadi 2014, Adams
et al. 2006, Ezrow 2008, Ezrow et al. 2011, Meguid 2005). While little consensus exists
on what niche parties really are and how to define them, they are generally understood to
be distinctly different from their mainstream rivals due to their non-centrist or extreme ide-
ologies, and because their agenda is centered around a limited set of issues that fall outside
the traditional class cleavage (Wagner 2012, 2). This distinction is important, since the
niche parties’ focus on “second dimension politics” greatly affects both their position and
strategic behavior in a competitive political environment. As such, one might expect niche
parties to be more policy-driven than their mainstream competitors, as their unconventional
and extremist program lowers their chances of being seen as an attractive coalition partner.
Indeed, Adams et al. (2006) find that mainstream parties are more responsive to public
opinion than niche parties. The latter, in fact, were systematically punished for position
changes. As put by Adams, “niche parties’ policy stability in the face of public opinion
shifts reflects the niche party elites’ belief that their core supporters are more ideologically
oriented than are the supporters of mainstream parties and will react badly to policy shifts in
their party’s election program because these supporters view such shifts - especially those
that moderate the niche party’s policies - as a betrayal of the party’s core values” (2012,
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406).
Consequently, there seems to be some resemblance between Schumacher et al.’s (2013)
focus on party organization and the distinction between niche and mainstream parties; both
assume a separation between office-seeking and policy-seeking behavior. It is important
to stress, however, that the two categorizations ultimately lead to different clusterings of
parties. Certainly, overlap may exist between the two groups, especially among mainstream
parties, but whereas Green parties typically rely on a strong activist base, populist radical
right parties often have a highly centralized leadership. Yet, both are consistently labeled
as niche parties. As such, the central question raised here is whether it is really party
organization that drives a party’s responsiveness to voter shifts, as Schumacher, de Vries &
Vis (2013) argue, or is niche-mainstream the defining distinction?
Hypothesis 1: Niche parties are more likely to respond to shifts in the party
voter position than to shifts in the mean voter position.
Ideology matters
Next, it also seems intuitive to qualify a party’s ideological position in the political
landscape. After all, no matter how activist (or leader) dominated a party is, if the median
voter is located far away from the party, why respond at all to its small positional changes
from one election to the next? In other words, almost by definition, the further a party is
removed from the ideological center, and thus the median voter, the more important the
position of its core constituency will become. From a demand-side perspective, too, this
assumption makes sense, as extremist voters can logically be expected to be more policy-
oriented than centrist voters (Grofman 2004: 33).
Hypothesis 2: Parties positioned further away from the center are more likely
to respond to shifts in the party voter position than to shifts in the mean voter
position.
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Party system fragmentation
Last, the number of parties that competes in a political system will greatly affect their
behavior, too. Two explanations, in particular, are worth discussing here. First, when the
ideological space is more crowded, each party’s room to maneuver will be more limited. To
remain ideologically differentiable from its competitors, a party needs to keep its distance.
In the words of Downs,
“political parties cannot move ideologically past each other. (. . . ) Integrity and
responsibility create relative immobility, which prevents a party from making
ideological leaps over the heads of its neighbors. Thus ideological movement is
restricted to horizontal progress at most up to - and never beyond - the nearest
party on either side” (1957, 122).
Thus, most parties will be prone to stick to representing the preferences of their support
base, rather than to make significant, and often risky, position changes in search for office.
A second reason why party system fragmentation might wash away the explanatory
power of party organization, is that one would expect parties in multiparty systems to be
more unitary in the first place. After all, the sheer availability of competitors provides
activists with ample opportunity to exit the party and either join an existing party or form a
new one, when preference disparities are brought to the fore. If the party leadership, in their
desire to get into office, pursues a median voter strategy that the activists no longer identify
with, the latter are free to leave. Thus, since internal party coherence must be larger in
highly fragmented party systems, the effect of party organization should be smaller in these
countries. Conversely, in systems with only a few parties, activists are left with fewer exit
strategies and both they themselves as well as the party leadership will have an incentive to
continue to work together, even in the presence of internal dispute.
Given that both explanations work in the same direction, the third and final hypothesis
can be formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Parties in fragmented party systems are more likely to respond
to shifts in the party voter position than to shifts in the mean voter position.
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Data & Method
To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section of this paper, I use the original
dataset by Schumacher, de Vries & Vis (2013). The dependent variable, change in party po-
sitions, is measured using the “rile-index” from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
(Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al. 2006). This measure has been extensively criticized
in the past, primarily for gauging issue salience and not ideological position, but the lack of
comparative data has led it to be the primary variable of choice.
The two crucial independent variables, mean voter change and mean party voter change,
are taken from the Eurobarometer surveys. Asking respondents to position themselves on
a left-right scale, the voter shift is subsequently calculated by taking the difference from
one election to the next in the average either among all the voters in a country (mean voter
change) or solely among the supporters of a party (party voter change) at t− 1.3
The original variable on party organization is created by combining two questions in-
cluded in the expert survey by Laver & Hunt (1992), specifically on how influential party
leaders and activists are in influencing party policy (see Schumacher, de Vries & Vis (2013,
468-470) for a more extensive discussion of this measure).
The niche-mainstream variable is the first of the independent variables added to the
original dataset. Similar to the conceptualization of niche parties, its operationalization is
no less contested. Most studies simply use a binary measure based on party family member-
ship (Adams et al. 2006, Ezrow et al. 2011, Meguid 2005), typically clustering communist,
green, and extreme right parties together. Yet, despite their obvious and immense differ-
ences on the traditional left-right dimension, their lack of ideological and organizational
overlap goes beyond mere positions alone. First, these groups of parties largely originated
in different time periods, with greens and radical right parties arriving to the political scene
from the 1970s onwards, whereas the European communist parties are often among the old-
est, still active parties in Europe - often having a higher age than most mainstream parties.
3The decision to use the ‘mean’ instead of the ‘median’ voter position is a methodological one: the Euro-
barometer indicator employed here is discrete, which results in a lack of variation in the position of the
median voter.
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Furthermore, whereas the agendas of the other two constituent party families are at least
primarily defined by non-economic, second-dimension political issues - which is often seen
as a key feature of niche parties - the communists compete more than any of their rivals on
economic issues.
An alternative, more sophisticated measure is developed by Wagner (2012). He de-
fines niche parties as primarily competing on (and emphasizing) a small number of non-
economic issues - while avoiding traditional economic ones - thus excluding parties like the
communists. Using a combination of expert surveys and CMP data, the resulting indicator,
although still dichotomous, has the strong advantage of being neither fixed over time nor
based on a party’s membership to a party family. Rather, its ideological program is key.
Ideological extremity is measured simply by taking a party’s absolute distance from the
center of the rile-scale. While more advanced methods could be used here, this straight-
forward measure should suffice in determining whether the importance of shifts in the po-
sitions of the mean voter and party voter is dependent on a party’s position in the political
landscape.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Party position change 0.50 15.85 -61.3 55.48
Independent variables
Mean voter change -0.05 0.18 -0.43 0.39
Party voter change -0.04 0.42 -1.65 2.38
Party organization 18.51 5.53 0.00 27.77
Distance from center 18.84 13.41 0.00 78.85
Party system fragmentation 4.31 1.66 1.69 9.05
Mainstream vs niche Frequency Percentage
Mainstream (=0) 586 84.56
Niche (=1) 107 15.44
Total 693 100.00
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Finally, to test the assumption that party system fragmentation matters for conditioning
the dynamic relationship between the internal workings of parties and inter-party compe-
tition, information on the effective number of parties in parliament is collected from Gal-
lagher & Mitchell (2005). Although some have dichotomized this variable by classifying
two-party systems as having an effective number of parties of 2.5 or less (Lehrer 2012,
1302), the continuous party system variable is used here.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1.4 The dependent variable,
party position change, ranges from -61.3 to 55.48, with an average almost exactly at zero
(0.50). The voter change variables are equally centered around zero, although the mean
party voter is, as one might expect, more flexible. Party organization has a maximum range
of 30, with higher scores indicating leadership-dominance, although its empirical range
runs from 0 to 27.77. The party with the most extreme ideological position has a distance
of 78.85 from the center, but the average across all parties is 18.84. The mean number
of effective parties in the studied countries is 4.31, but the range is rather big (1.69-9.05).
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the niche-mainstream distinction is measured using a dummy
variable (0=mainstream, 1=niche). Just over 15% of the parties included in this study are
qualified as niche (mapped for each individual election).5
Results
This section presents the empirical results of this paper. For the sake of comparability,
all the extensions and hypotheses are tested separately in order to assess the extent to which
the original findings by Schumacher, de Vries & Vis (2013) hold up. In addition, like the
authors’ original analysis, I also correct for heteroskedasticity and a first-order autoregres-
sive (AR1) structure in the panel residuals. It is questionable, however, to what extent these
4Electoral defeat is not discussed here, as it is only included for comparative purposes and not of any theoret-
ical interest.
5Note that the included independent variables do gauge different phenomena, as can seen from the low corre-
lations presented in Table 3 (see Appendix).
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problems are truly affecting the analysis, given the fact that the dependent variable is differ-
enced (i.e change in position from one election to the next). Normally, differencing should
take care of both problems, especially since heteroskedasticity is often caused by strongly
different starting values.6 Yet, since the focus here is on the theoretical contribution of
Schumacher, de Vries & Vis (2013), I adopt their estimation technique.7
The output of all four regression models is presented in Table 2. Model 1 is an identical
replication of Schumacher et al.’s (2013) original results. Of specific interest are the in-
teraction terms between party organization and party voter change and mean voter change,
respectively. While the sign and statistical significance are immediately interpretable, the
best way to make sense of this interaction is by using marginal effects plots (see Figure
1). The graphs show that the marginal effect of mean voter change is only significant for
leadership-dominated parties - in fact, it is negative for parties controlled by activists. The
effect of party voter change, on the other hand, is always positive, but loses strength as
a party becomes more leadership-dominated. Clearly, this is in line with their theoretical
expectation, as party leaders are more interested in making it into office, and pursuing a
median voter strategy is, so the argument goes, the best way to achieve that goal.
6Indeed, exactly because the dependent variable is differenced, leaving out the correction for panel-specific
AR1 does little to the results. This is not the case for omitting the correction for heteroskedasticity, though, as
this deprives all the original coefficient estimates from their statistical significance. Several of the variables
I add, however, remain statistically significant, including some of the interaction terms (not shown here).
7Note, however, that the authors state that they correct for heteroskedasticity using Panel Corrected Standard
Errors (PCSEs) (Schumacher, de Vries & Vis 2013, 471), which is not the correct way to deal with this
problem. Instead, PCSEs are a solution to contemporaneous correlation. That being said, it seems that the
model they actually run does not use PCSEs, but regular robust standard errors.
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Table 2: Regression analysis of party position changes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(original) (niche) (ideology) (fragmentation)
Defeat 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.03
(0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11)
Party voter change 16.24∗ 16.86∗ 7.93∗ 15.54∗
(3.10) (3.42) (2.91) (3.86)
Mean voter change -14.50∗ -18.98∗ -34.34∗ -30.77∗
(5.75) (8.04) (7.09) (10.79)
Party organization 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.00
(0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Party voter change × -0.59∗ -0.59∗ -0.31∗ -0.38
party organization (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.23)
Mean voter change × 0.87∗ 1.16∗ 1.21∗ 0.09
party organization (0.32) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40)
Party voter change × 34.97∗ 41.35∗ 13.09 33.60
mean voter change (17.40) (20.60) (16.31) (22.63)
Party voter change × -1.19 -0.98 -0.32 -1.26
mean voter change × party org. (0.79) (0.99) (0.71) (1.10)
Niche party -2.54∗
(0.85)
Party voter change × 4.47
niche party (3.38)
Mean voter change × -9.03
niche party (6.71)
Distance center 0.17∗
(0.01)
Party voter change × 0.22∗
distance center (0.08)
Mean voter change × 0.75∗
distance center (0.16)
Party system fragmentation -0.18
(0.83)
Party voter change × 0.22∗
party system fragmentation (0.10)
Mean voter change × 0.53∗
party system fragmentation (0.17)
Constant 2.89 9.69 -1.30 2.08
(2.48) (1.74) (2.46) (3.49)
N 324 300 324 324
Wald 2367.33 127456.06 5800.67 4135.92
Table entries are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients corrected for panel-level heteroskedasticity
with country dummies (not shown in table) and standard errors (in parentheses).
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Fig. 1: Marginal effects of voter change on party positions
by party organization
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The first of the extensions, presented in model 2, concerns the niche-mainstream dis-
tinction. Are niche parties truly different from their mainstream competitors, as suggested
in the literature, or does this categorization lack explanatory power? The evidence, at least
to some extent, points in the direction of the latter. Although the niche dummy is statis-
tically significant, this is by itself not of substantive interest. In fact, all the variables of
the original model show highly similar coefficient estimates; some have even gained in
strength. To make sense of the interactions between niche parties and mean and party voter
change, we once again look at the marginal effects plots. Figure 2 confirms that, indeed,
the niche-mainstream distinction does not lead to statistically significant results, as the con-
fidence intervals around the estimates cover zero. While the coefficient estimates go in the
right direction, i.e. a negative marginal effect of mean voter change for niche parties, we
lack certainty to interpret this finding. For party voter change, however, we do find a statis-
tically significant effect. Specifically, when moving from mainstream to niche parties, the
marginal effect of party voter change increases. This is in line with the literature and, thus,
provides partial support for hypothesis 1. Yet, since the effect of party organization is still
statistically significant, we can be relatively certain that the authors’ original findings were
not driven by, or conditional on, the difference between niche and mainstream parties.
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Fig. 2: Marginal effects of voter change on party positions
for mainstream vs niche parties
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Next, we control for parties’ ideological eccentricity by including the variables that
map their distance from the center (see model 3). All three variables, the two interaction
terms and the individual variable itself, are statistically significant. Moreover, as can be
seen from Figure 3, the confidence intervals generally do not include zero, meaning that
the marginal effect of both mean voter change and party voter change at different distances
from the center is statistically significant. Interestingly, while the marginal effect of party
voter change grows as a party is further removed from the center, which is in line with
hypothesis 2, the same holds for mean voter change. A possible explanation for this is
that some established parties, that you would logically expect to respond to the mean voter,
could be further removed from the center as well, e.g. conservative parties. This demands
further testing, however. Equally interesting, while mean voter shift by itself as well as its
interaction with party organization are left relatively untouched by adding the ideological
eccentricity variables, party voter change has lost much of its explanatory power and, in
the case of the interaction term with party organization, its statistical significance, too.
Arguably, then, a party’s ideological position to some extent undermines the effect of party
organization on position change.
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Fig. 3: Marginal effects of voter change on party positions
by distance from center
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Finally, in order to test the third hypothesis, measures of party system fragmentation
are added to the original model (see model 4). In contrast to the previous extensions, none
of the party organization variables are now still statistically significant. The interaction
terms with the effective number of parties, on the other hand, are. Looking at Figure 4, it is
clear that, in line with hypothesis 3, the marginal effect of party voter change decreases as
the effective number of parties in a system increases. In other words, parties become less
responsive to changes in the position of their supporters as the political spectrum becomes
more crowded. This could be both because parties’ ideological flexibility is now limited by
the large number of competitors or because their supporters now move less as well, since
they would just switch parties if they find themselves too far removed from its ideological
position. The marginal effects plot for mean voter change provides a more confusing result,
as it suggests that in countries with low fragmentation parties are not responsive to the mean
voter, while in highly fragmented systems they are. One possible interpretation could be
that in the countries with only a few parties, the voter distribution is more bimodal, leading
the established parties to follow their supporters and not some hypothetical mean voter.
Why the effect of mean voter change is strongest in the most fragmented systems requires
further investigation and undeniably contradicts our general view of party competition.
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Fig. 4: Marginal effects of voter change on party positions
by party system fragmentation
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Discussion
This paper set out to test under what conditions the internal balance of power between
activists and leaders affects a party’s responsiveness to changes in voter positions. To be
specific, is it true that leadership-dominated parties follow the mean voter, whereas activist-
dominated parties respond to shifts in the position of their own supporters (Schumacher,
de Vries & Vis 2013)? Several alternative explanations that could explain this distinction
were presented, focusing on the type of party in question (niche vs. mainstream), its ideo-
logical eccentricity, and the level of fragmentation of the party system it competes in.
Contrary to what the dominant literature would have us expect (Adams et al. 2006,
Ezrow et al. 2011, Meguid 2005), the hypothesis regarding the different behavior of niche
parties could only be partially confirmed. More crucially, adding these variables to the
model did little to undermine the alleged importance of party organization. A party’s dis-
tance from the center and the effective number of parties do matter, however. Not only
were these effects themselves statistically significant, they also reduced the importance of
party organization. How these characteristics interact with party organization can certainly
be studied in more detail, but I hope to have provided a first comparative test of their rele-
vance.
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To conclude, Schumacher et al. (2013) made an incredibly valuable, and innovative,
contribution to the field by linking the internal workings of a party to its strategic behavior
in a competitive environment. Yet, at the very least, this effect is conditional on other factors
(both endogenous and exogenous) and these need to be accounted for to provide a full and
accurate picture of this relationship.
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APPENDIX
Table 3: Correlation matrix
∆ Party ∆ Mean ∆ Party Party Niche Distance Party sys.
position voter pos. voter pos. org. parties center frag.
∆ Party position 1.00
∆ Mean voter pos. 0.07 1.00
∆ Party voter pos. 0.05 0.26 1.00
Party organization -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
Niche parties -0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.18 1.00
Distance center 0.01 0.09 0.04 -0.10 -0.01 1.00
Party sys. frag. -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.11 0.01 -0.10 1.00
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